There are two ways a trustee can have their administration approved and be discharged. First, they may apply for a passing of accounts pursuant to section 23 of the Trustee Act. Alternatively, they “can avoid the cost and delay of a passing, and instead ask the beneficiaries to approve their administration and provide for their informal discharge directly” by way of a release.
One of the most important features of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. The right of survivorship means that when one of the owners dies, his or her interest in the property passes to the other named owner. To avoid this result and have an ownership interest pass to an estate, the joint tenancy must be severed so that each ownership interest is converted to a tenancy in common.
In D’Angelo Estate, Re, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to appoint a monitor to supervise the actions of the co-executors and ensure that the Estate was properly administered. Justice Quinn relied on the court’s discretion to attach conditions to the grant of probate, as are necessary, to achieve the wishes of the testator. In the specific circumstances of this case, it was determined that the appointment of a Monitor would respect the testator’s choice of estate trustees.
The doctrine of undue influence is frequently employed to attack gifts. However, can the doctrine of equitable fraud apply when the requirements of undue influence are not otherwise met? That is the subject of this blog.
Rule 13.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) specifies where proceedings (which includes applications and actions) are to be commenced.
In Piekut, the court determined that a codicil to a will was valid notwithstanding that the application was commenced more than two years after the applicant discovered the codicil’s existence. Justice Dietrich made this determination despite case law that stands for the proposition that a party seeking to challenge a will must do so within two years from the date of the deceased's death, subject to the discoverability rules in the Limitations Act.
In New Brunswick the legislation provides a judge with discretion to ignore the formalities of execution and that is what happened here. Could that happen in Ontario?
This blog is about the duty of a trustee to supervise and not to delegate.
Can one executor be held liable for the actions of a co-executor? This is the question put to the court in Cahill v. Cahill.
In our previous blogs, we discussed many of the procedural and cost implications associated with the death of a party. Oftentimes, however, the death of a litigant causes more than just a procedural hiccup and can be quite prejudicial to the deceased litigant’s case. For instance, in cases where the deceased litigant’s cause of action relies heavily on the deceased litigant’s personal knowledge and recollection of events.
In this blog, we look at a unique scenario where a Trustee has no legal right to continue an action and must discontinue. Who bears the costs in this scenario? The vast majority of claims commenced by a deceased party can be continued following the person’s death. Section 38 of the Trustee Act is the statutory provision regulating the recovery of damages on behalf of a deceased.
In our last blog, we reviewed the procedural steps that need to be taken upon a litigant’s death and what steps a litigant’s executor must take in order to continue a lawsuit. But what happens if a litigant’s executor (the “Trustee”) (and/or the beneficiaries) has a sober second look at the lawsuit and decides that the deceased litigant’s case is not particularly strong and they don’t want to obtain an order to continue with the proceeding?