skip to Main Content

equitable fraud
Print Friendly, PDF & Email

Equitable fraud – an overlooked arrow in the lawyer’s quiver?

The abridged version of this article was originally published by The Lawyer’s Daily, part of Lexis Nexis Canada Inc. Part One was was published on September 10, 2019. Part Two was published on September 17, 2019.

Introduction

The doctrine of undue influence is frequently employed to attack gifts.1 However, can the doctrine of equitable fraud apply when the requirements of undue influence are not otherwise met? That is the subject of this blog.

The doctrines of undue influence and equitable fraud2 are closely related. Both depend on a relationship predicated on vulnerability.3 While the circumstances in which undue influence and equitable fraud may apply frequently overlap, doctrinally they are distinct. In some ways, equitable fraud is the broader of the two doctrines.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s description of equitable fraud suggests that transactions that offend the court’s moral compass4 as being unconscionable may be set aside even in the absence of deceit or a special relationship between the parties5.

Undue Influence

In Goodman Estate v. Geffen6, Justice Wilson of the Supreme Court of Canada described the presumption of undue influence as arising in a situation in which “one person [has the ability] to dominate the will of another, whether through manipulation, coercion, or outright but subtle abuse of power”.7

In order to trigger a presumption of undue influence, the first question the court is tasked to decide is whether the “potential for domination inheres in the nature of the relationship itself”. Equity has traditionally recognized certain types of relationships in which a presumption of undue influence arises. One such relationship is between parent and child.8

However, the overriding concern is relationships which give rise to dependency, which are not always easy to categorize. For example, minor children are typically dependent on their parents (or those who act in a similar capacity). In contrast, elderly parents may be dependent on their adult children, effectively a role reversal caused by aging.

If the requisite type of relationship of dependency and the potential for domination is found, then the second question the court must consider is the nature of the transaction itself. In the case of gifts, the court’s concern is that the donor’s “beneficence not be tainted.”

If circumstances giving rise to the presumption of undue influence are found, then the legal burden shifts to the recipient of the gift to demonstrate that undue influence was not employed against the donor in connection with the making of the gift. The presumption of undue influence may be rebutted by showing that no actual influence was deployed, that the donor had independent legal advice in connection with making the gift, etc.

This gives rise to an interesting question. What if the recipient of the gift is able to discharge their burden of showing that no undue influence was deployed against the donor, for example by showing that the donor obtained independent legal advice before making the gift, but that the effect of the gift is to render the donor a pauper? The doctrine of equitable fraud arguably may apply in such a situation if the nature or effect of the gift itself offends the “conscience” of the court.

Equitable Fraud

While equitable fraud is also grounded in a relationship of vulnerability, unlike undue influence, it does not necessarily depend on the ability of one person to dominate the will of another. Instead,  equitable fraud concerns “conduct which, having regard to some special relationship between the two parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for one to do towards the other”.  Others argue that no special relationship is required.9

Equitable fraud is distinct from common law fraud because it does not depend on dishonesty. Instead, it is predicated on the breach of a duty imposed by equity.10 As explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd.:11

What amounts to “fraud or the equivalent of fraud” is, of course, a crucial question. In First City Capital Ltd. v. British Columbia Building Corp. (1989), 1989 CanLII 2868 (BC SC), 43 B.L.R. 29 (B.C.S.C.), McLachlin C.J.S.C. (as she then was) observed that “in this context ‘fraud or the equivalent of fraud’ refers not to the tort of deceit or strict fraud in the legal sense, but rather to the broader category of equitable fraud or constructive fraud…Fraud in this wider sense refers to transactions falling short of deceit but where the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the advantage obtained” (p. 37). Fraud in the “wider sense” of a ground for equitable relief “is so infinite in its varieties that the Courts have not attempted to define it”, but “all kinds of unfair dealing and unconscionable conduct in matters of contract come within its ken”.

Some other differences between equitable fraud and undue influence are worth noting.  Undue influence involves a rogue taking steps to coerce.  Equitable fraud may come about even in the absence of some action.  It may just be an omission the constitutes equitable fraud.  It may even be an honest inadvertent, mistake12. It is the unconscionable result that is the key.

Discussion

The recent case of Roach v. Todd13 is a good example of how the doctrine of equitable fraud may be employed. One of the issues that arose in that case was a gift made by an elderly father, Willie, to his daughter, Claudette, in the amount of $57,000, leaving only $2,961.31 in Willie’s bank account (the “Impugned Gift”). While this case turned in large measure on undue influence and Willie’s apparent lack of capacity to make the Impugned Gift, the doctrine of equitable fraud would also likely apply.14

Claudette acted as Willie’s attorney under a continuing power of attorney for property executed by Willie (the “POA”). The evidence established that Claudette exercised sole control over Willie’s financial affairs from the time that the POA was signed until Willie’s death.

At the time that Willie made the Impugned Gift to Claudette, Willie was in a hospital and was suffering from significant cognitive impairments. The evidence appeared to show that Claudette had prepared a document which she had Willie sign in secret in connection with the Impugned Gift, which was purportedly made by Willie to Claudette to compensate her for taking care of him.

However, after the Impugned Gift was made, Willie only lived with Claudette for six months and was then transferred to a care home for the remainder of his life. Willie, thus, gave Claudette effectively $9,500.00 per month for any care she rendered during the short period of time that he actually lived with her.

Willie received no independent legal advice in connection with the Impugned Gift. The only witness to the document evidencing the Impugned Gift was Claudette’s fiancé. Justice Heeney found it to be incredible that no nurse or other person at the busy hospital where Willie was an inpatient could be found to act as an independent witness and, therefore, concluded that the Impugned Gift was intended by Claudette to have been made in secret and without the scrutiny of her siblings.

Although Justice Heeney’s judgment turned on undue influence and Willie’s lack of capacity to make the Impugned Gift, it could have equally been decided under the doctrine of equitable fraud. As explained by John E. S. Poyser15 in his case annotation16:

…The judge then found that the gift could be set aside on the grounds of equitable inter vivos undue influence, and more specifically equitable undue influence by presumption. Again, this ground is in common judicial use.

Heeney J. then went on to find that the child who received the gifts was acting in a fiduciary role as the attorney for property of the gift-maker, and therefore had a duty to act in his best interests. She violated her duty by encouraging and accepting gifts from him in circumstances that effectively reduced him to the state of a pauper. No authority was cited, but this is a traditional ground that allows a court to set a gift aside as voidable under the doctrine of equitable fraud.

This raises an interesting issue. What if the facts in Roach v. Todd were different such that: (1) the presumption of undue influence was rebutted; and (2) Willie’s capacity to make the Impugned Gift was not in issue. For example, what if the evidence showed that while Willie was in the hospital convalescing, that he contacted his long-time solicitor, Mr. Law, and instructed him to prepare documents associated with the Impugned Gift, which were later witnessed by Mr. Law and a nurse at the hospital without Claudette or her fiancé being present. What if also, Claudette made no suggestion or representation that she would take care of Willie in exchange for the Impugned Gift, but Willie decided to give it to her anyways. On those hypothetical facts, arguably the presumption of undue influence may have been found to be rebutted by the court.

Yet, as Claudette was managing Willie’s financial affairs under a POA, and the fact of the Impugned Gift rendered Willie “a pauper”, the Impugned Gift may have arguably been set aside on the basis of the doctrine of equitable fraud alone as being unconscionable for Claudette to accept in the circumstances.

A case in point where the equitable fraud argument might have made a difference is the case of John Gironda et al. v. Vito Gironda et al.17 In that case, the applicants argued that Vito Gironda exercised undue influence over his mother for her to change her will and to gift all of her money ($175,000) to him. They argued that she was physically and emotionally dependent on Vito; she was socially isolated because Vito alienated the rest of the family; there was a great deal of family conflict between Vito and his brothers; the mother had experienced recent bereavement in the loss of her husband of almost 60 years; she was making a will which was significantly more favourable to Vito than her prior wills; and, simultaneously, executing new powers of attorney for property and personal care removing her existing joint attorneys. Justice Penny observed as follows:

I certainly agree that there are grounds for the suspicion of undue influence in these circumstances and that, particularly given the signs of some cognitive decline, careful probing of the circumstances surrounding the execution of these documents is warranted. It is not sufficient, however, merely to allege the possibility or suspicion of undue influence.  There must be evidence to establish the presence of undue influence on a balance of probabilities.18

Query whether the transfer to Vito of all his mother’s money and her house would have met the threshold of unconscionability to set these inter vivos transfers aside absent the finding of undue influence. In these sorts of cases, equitable fraud may have been another arrow in the quiver.

Conclusion

The elastic and open-ended definition of equitable fraud is a cause of concern for some.  Its very flexibility makes it difficult to apply and defend against.  Case law demonstrates that judges sometimes rely on this doctrine to deviate from an unfair strict application of legal technical rights.  It is a doctrine that could very well be a useful weapon against an unconscionable result. For those lawyers who are considering how equitable fraud might be pleaded, a sample Statement of Claim is available on our website.

The abridged version of this article was originally published by The Lawyer’s Daily, part of Lexis Nexis Canada Inc. Part One was was published on September 10, 2019. Part Two was published on September 17, 2019.

Footnotes
  1.   In Danicki v. Danicki, (1995) O.J. No. 3995 at para. 29, the court defined “gift” as follows:

    “A gift is property that is transferred gratuitously during the lifetime of a donor who is not in expectation of death: Halsbury’s, 4th Vol. 20, para. I. Gifts have three fundamental characteristics: an intention to donate; acceptance; and an act of delivery. Once a gift is perfected, it is irrevocable in the same way as is a contract, unless a defense such as duress or undue influence applies: Brown v. Davy (1889), 18 O.R. 59 (H.C.) Inter vivos transactions normally take effect immediately upon the document being executed. It is however possible to provide that the gift is not to take effect until a later, stipulated point in time, but this obviously must be before the donor’s death”.

    For those interested in researching the topic of Equitable Fraud in detail we refer you to the following secondary sources which are of interest:

    1.John E.S. Poyser, Annotation :  Roach v. Todd, 46 E.T.R. (4th) 67;

    2. John E.S. Poyser, Excerpt from Law of Capacity and Undue Influence, Chapter 6 -9 and in particular section 4 of Chapter 9 which is titled “Transactions Amounting to Equitable Fraud;
     

  2.   First City Capital Ltd. v. British Columbia Building Corp., 1989 CarswellBC 309, (1989) B.C.W.L.D. 839, (1989) C.L.D. 461, (1989) B.C.J. No. 130, 14 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, 14 A.C.W.S. (3d) 43, 43 B.L.R. 29 (BCSC).

    See Trevor Todd’s blog on Equitable Fraud dated January 8th 2015 found on line at http://disinherited.com/equitable-fraud/  He mentions a number of cases worth reviewing;

    Fraik v Pilon 2012 CarswellBC 1037, 2012 BCSC 528, (2012) B.C.W.L.D. 4900, (2012) B.C.W.L.D. 4901, (2012) B.C.W.L.D. 4910, 18 R.P.R. (5th) 271.

    Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 CarswellAlta 186, 2002 CarswellAlta 187, 2002 SCC 19, 2002 CSC 19, (2002) 1 S.C.R. 678, (2002) 5 W.W.R. 193, (2002) S.C.J. No. 20, 111 A.C.W.S. (3d) 733, 209 D.L.R. (4th) 318, 20 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 266 W.A.C. 201, 283 N.R. 233, 299 Most Recent Distinguished: Barrett v. Kasha | 2014 ABQB 12, 2014 CarswellAlta 563, (2014) A.W.L.D. 2901, (2014) A.W.L.D. 2959, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 797 | (Alta. Q.B., Jan 6, 2014).R. 201, 50 R.P.R. (3d) 212, 98 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, J.E. 2002-448, REJB 2002-28038.

    McMaster University v. Wilchar Construction Ltd. (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Ont. H.C.), at p. 19. Proceedings: Affirmed, (1973), 12 O.R. (2d) 512n, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 400 (note) (Ont. C.A.)Most Recent Distinguished: Ottawa (City) Non-Profit Housing Corp. v. Canvar Construction (1991) Inc. | 1999 CarswellOnt 1672, 46 C.L.R. (2d) 116, 88 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1167, 96 O.T.C. 391 | (Ont. Gen. Div., Jun 1, 1999)

    Montreal Trust Co. v. Maley (1992), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Sask. C.A.), per Wakeling J.A.;

    Alampi v. Swartz (1964), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 11 (Ont. C.A.);

    Stepps Investments Ltd. v. Security Capital Corp. (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 351 (Ont. H.C.), per Grange J. (as he then was), at pp. 362-63; and Waddams, supra, at para. 342.Most Recent Not followed: Staltari Realty Corp. v. Colliers Macaulay Nicolls (Ontario) Inc. | 1996 CarswellOnt 4133, 16 O.T.C. 397, 66 A.C.W.S. (3d) 599 | (Ont. Gen. Div., Oct 28, 1996)

    Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company, 2008 BCCA 278 , at para. 94, leave to appeal to SCC refused, (2009), 395 N.R. 388.
     

  3.   Both doctrines also have their genesis in equity, a body of rules, maxims, principles and remedies first developed by the Lord Chancellor and the Court of Chancery in England to remedy situations in which the strict requirements of the common law may have worked an injustice. With the merger of law and equity by the Judicature Acts in England in the 1870s, the common law courts gained the jurisdiction to apply equitable remedies when appropriate. In Ontario, this is confirmed by section 96(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides that “Courts shall administer concurrently all rules of equity and the common law.” Now, where a rule of equity conflicts with a rule of the common law, the rule of equity prevails. See section 96(2).
     
  4.   See paragraph 48 of McMaster University v. Wilchar Construction Ltd., 1971 CarswellOnt 775, (1971) 3 O.R. 801, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 9, which stated:

    (T)he type of fraud which affords a cause of action for deceit has been precisely classified, but fraud in the wider sense in which the term is used when stated as a ground for equitable relief, is so infinite in its varieties that the Courts have not attempted to define it: see Allcard v. Skinner (1887), 36 Ch.D. 145 at p. 183. Hunter, C.J.B.C., in Orchardson v. Dominion Bank, (1923) 2 W.W.R. 958 at p. 961, 32 B.C.R. 348, said: “…new phases of fraud are constantly arising, but all kinds of unfair dealing and unconscionable conduct in matters of contract come within its ken”. Fraud, in a sense to which equity has attached its disapproval, extends to transactions in which the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he has obtained.
     

  5.   See paragraph 27 of First City Capital Ltd. v. British Columbia Building Corp. 1989 CarswellBC 309, (1989) B.C.W.L.D. 839, (1989) C.L.D. 461, (1989) B.C.J. No. 130, 14 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, 14 A.C.W.S. (3d) 43, 43 B.L.R. 29, which states, in part:

    It is accepted that in this context “fraud or the equivalent of fraud” refers not to the tort of deceit or strict fraud in the legal sense, but rather to the broader category of equitable fraud or constructive fraud: McMaster University, supra; Taylor v. Johnson (1983), 57 A.L.J.R. 197 (Aust. H.C.). Fraud in this wider sense refers to transactions falling short of deceit but where the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the advantage obtained: McMaster University, at p. 19; Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, (1914) A.C. 932, (1914-15) All E.R. Rep. 45 (H.L.).

    and See paragraphs 10-11 of Windjammer Homes Inc. v. Generation Enterprises, 1989 CanLII 2872 (BC SC)  which states, in part:

    Something more than one party’s mistake is necessary:“To succeed on a plea of unilateral mistake the defendant must establish:

    1. that a mistake occurred;

    2. that there was fraud or the equivalent of fraud on the plaintiff’s part in that she knew or must be taken to have known when the agreement was executed that the defendant misunderstood its significance and that she did nothing to enlighten the defendant: Blay v. Pollard & Morris (1930) 1 K.B. 628; Farah v. Barki 1955 CanLII 3 (SCC), (1955) S.C.R. 107, 2 D.L.R. 657.”

    (Stepps Investments, supra, at 362, aff’g Alampi v. Swartz, 1964 CanLII 303 (ON CA), (1964) 1 O.R. 488, 43 D.L.R. (2d) 11 at 17 (C.A.) per McGillivray J.A.)

    It is this “equivalent of fraud which falls to equity”:

    “(E)quity does not require the certainty which had led to the narrow common law doctrine of fundamental mistake. It seeks rather the more broad and more elastic approach by attempting to do justice and to relieve against hardship…. Fraud, in a sense to which equity has attached its disapproval, extends to transactions in which the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he has obtained.”
     

  6.   Goodman Estate v. Geffen, (1991) S.C.J. No. 53.
     
  7.   Ibid at para. 40.
     
  8.   Other types of relationships include that between guardian and ward, solicitor and client, etc.
     
  9.  The idea that equitable fraud is connected to “some special relationship” was articulated in Matravers v. Bookman & Harris  1980 CarswellOnt 463, 111 D.L.R. (3d) 230, 20 C.P.C. 118, 28 O.R. (2d) 607 where the court quotes, at paragraph 23 Lord Evershet in   Kitchen v. Royal Air Force Association, (1958) 1 W.L.R. 563 (C.A.) at p. 573.  where he stated at p. 249: “What is covered by equitable fraud is a matter which Lord Hardwicke did not attempt to define two hundred years ago, and I certainly shall not attempt to do so now, but it is, I think, clear that the phrase covers conduct which, having regard to some special relationship between the two parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for the one to do towards the other.”

    Compare the view of the need of some ‘special relationship’ to establish equitable fraud with those cases in contract where the doctrine of equitable fraud is applied in the absence of a “special relationship”  See See McMaster University v. Wilchar Construction Ltd., (1971) 3 O.R. 801, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (H.C.), affirmed (1973), 12 O.R. (2d) 512n, 69 O.L.R. (3d) 400n (C.A.), Windjammer Homes Inc. v. Generation Enterprises (1989), 1989 CanLII 2872 (BC SC), 43 B.L.R. 315 at 320 (B.C.S.C.), Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19 (CanLII), (2002) 1 S.C.R. 678,   These are cases where, as the court said inFirst City Capital Ltd. v. British Columbia Building Corp. (1989), 1989 CanLII 2868 (BC SC), 43 B.L.R. 29 (B.C.S.C.),  “all kinds of unfair dealing and unconscionable conduct in matters of contract come within its ken.”
     

  10.   John E. S. Poyser, Annotation: Roach v. Todd, 46 E.T.R. (4th) at p. 67.
     
  11.   Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19 at para. 39.
     
  12.   See McMaster University v. Wilchar Construction Ltd., (1971) 3 O.R. 801, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (H.C.), affirmed (1973), 12 O.R. (2d) 512n, 69 O.L.R. (3d) 400n (C.A.), Thompson, J., in dealing with a case of unilateral mistake stated, at pp. 810-1 O.R., pp. 18-9 D.L.R.:

    Equity, however, will intervene in certain cases to relieve against the rigours of the common law, even though the mistake would not be operative at law. If, for lack of consensus, no contract comes into existence, there, of course, is nothing to which an equity can attach. It is only in cases where the contract is not void at law that equity may afford relief by declaring the contract voidable. It gives relief for certain types of mistakes which the common law disregards and its remedies are more flexible. Thus, equity does not require the certainty which had led to the narrow common law doctrine of fundamental mistake. It seeks rather the more broad and more elastic approach by attempting to do justice and to relieve against hardship. In equity, to admit of correction, mistake need not relate to the essential substance of the contract, and provided that there is mistake as to the promise or as to some material term of the contract, if the Court finds that there has been honest, even though inadvertent, mistake, it will afford relief in any case where it considers that it would be unfair, unjust or unconscionable not to correct it: see Webster v. Cecil, supra ((1861), 30 Beav. 62, 54 E.R. 812); Hartog v. Colin and Shields, supra and A. Roberts & Co. Ltd. et al. v. Leicestershire County Council, (1961) 1 Ch. 555, (1961) 2 All E.R. 545.

    Also see Fraik v. Pilon, 2012 BCSC 528 (CanLII) paragraphs 37-39

    (37)           In the context of mistake of contract as presented by the plaintiff here, equitable fraud is equivalent to fraud but takes an “elastic approach” by attempting to do justice and relieve against hardship caused by transactions in which “it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he has obtained” (Windjammer Homes Inc. v. Generation Enterprises (1989), 1989 CanLII 2872 (BC SC), 43 B.L.R. 315 at 320 (B.C.S.C.)).

    (38)           The concept arose before the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19 (CanLII), (2002) 1 S.C.R. 678 (Performance Industries). In that case, the plaintiff had been mistaken about the description of a development property that was purchased and alleged that the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s mistake when the plaintiff signed the agreement. For rectification of the contract to occur, the Court said that there had to exist a prior oral contract whose terms were definite and ascertainable, the plaintiff had to prove that the oral terms were not written down properly, the defendant must be shown to have known or ought to have known of the plaintiff’s error at the time of execution of the agreement, and the attempt of the defendant to rely upon the agreement must amount to “fraud or the equivalent of fraud” (Performance Industries at para. 31). Rectification is not a substitute for failure of due diligence. The crucial question of what amounts to equitable fraud was described by Binnie J. as follows at para. 39:

    39   What amounts to “fraud or the equivalent of fraud” is, of course, a crucial question. In First City Capital Ltd. v. British Columbia Building Corp. (1989), 1989 CanLII 2868 (BC SC), 43 B.L.R. 29 (B.C.S.C.), McLachlin C.J.S.C. (as she then was) observed that “in this context ‘fraud or the equivalent of fraud’ refers not to the tort of deceit or strict fraud in the legal sense, but rather to the broader category of equitable fraud or constructive fraud …. Fraud in this wider sense refers to transactions falling short of deceit but where the Court is of the opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the advantage obtained” (p. 37). Fraud in the “wider sense” of a ground for equitable relief “is so infinite in its varieties that the Courts have not attempted to define it”, but “all kinds of unfair dealing and unconscionable conduct in matters of contract come within its ken”: McMaster University v. Wilchar Construction Ltd. (1971), 1971 CanLII 594 (ON SC), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Ont. H.C.), at p. 19. See also Montreal Trust Co. v. Maley (1992), 1992 CanLII 8264 (SK CA), 99 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Sask. C.A.), per Wakeling J.A.; Alampi v. Swartz (1964), 1964 CanLII 303 (ON CA), 43 D.L.R. (2d) 11 (Ont. C.A.); Stepps Investments Ltd. v. Security Capital Corp. (1976), 1976 CanLII 648 (ON SC), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 351 (Ont. H.C.), per Grange J. (as he then was), at pp. 362-63; and Waddams, supra, at para. 342.

    See also Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company, 2008 BCCA 278 (CanLII) at para. 94, leave to appeal to SCC refused, (2009), 395 N.R. 388 (note).
     

  13.   Roach v. Todd, 2018 ONSC 5289.
     
  14.   John E. S. Poyser, Annotation: Roach v. Todd, 46 E.T.R. (4th) at pp. 67-69.
     
  15.   John E. S. Poyser is a partner with Tradition Law LLP in Winnipeg, Manitoba. He is also a senior lawyer with Whaley Estate Litigation Partners.
     
  16.   John E. S. Poyser, Annotation: Roach v. Todd, 46 E.T.R. (4th) at p. 67.
     
  17.   John Gironda et al. v. Vito Gironda et al., 2013 ONSC 4133.
     
  18.   Ibid at para. 80.
     

Matthew Stroh and Charles Wagner

The authors of this blog are Matthew Stroh and Charles Wagner. Charles is a Certified Specialist in Estates and Trusts and partner at Wagner Sidlofsky LLP. Matthew is a senior member of the estate and litigation groups. He maintains a broad civil, commercial, insurance and securities litigation practice.

This blog is not intended to serve as a comprehensive treatment of the topic. It is not meant to be legal advice. Every case turns on its specific facts and it would be a mistake for the reader of this blog to conclude how it might impact on the reader’s case. Nothing replaces retaining a qualified, competent lawyer, well versed in this niche area of practice and getting some good legal advice.

Back To Top